PERSIA. No. 1 (1908). 


-^7 


EXTRACT FROM A DESPATCH 


PROM 




THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE SECRETARY OF 

! •• 

STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL, 


DATED SEPTEMBER 21, 1899, 


> / , 


RELATING To 


. j ; 


C, ' ) 


BRITISH POLICY IN PERSIA, 


WHICH WAS REFERRED TO IN THE DEBATE ON THE 
ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION, WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE HOUSE OF 
LORDS ON FEBRUARY 6 AND 10, 1908. 


aj t m 


—7 


Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty. 

February 1908. 


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. '3j Vj 2 

Extract from a Despatch from the Government of India, 
to the Secretary of State for India in Council, dated 
September 21, 1899, relating to British Policy in Persia, 
which was referred to in the Debate on the Anglo- 
Russian Convention, which took place in the House of 
Lords on February 6 and 10, 1908. 


Government of Tndia to Lord G. Hamilton. 

(Extract.) Simla , September 21, 1899. 

AVE desire to address your Lordship and. through your Lordship, Her Majesty’s 
Government, on the subject of the relations of Great Britain with Persia. We might 
find an adequate reason for so doing in the fact that your Lordship has directly 
invited an expression of the views of the Government of India upon the question of 
the maintenance of our influence in Persia ; and, while calling our attention to the 
desirability of improving the Political and Consular Service in that country, has at 
the same time stated your desire to he made acquainted with our opinions upon the 
remaining questions under discussion. But, in any case we should have felt it our 
duty at an early date to address your Lordship on the subject. Although the rela¬ 
tions of Great Britain with Persia have for a period of exactly a century occupied a 
large, and perhaps at times a disproportionate, space upon the field of international 
diplomacy; although during that time Great Britain has twice broken off diplomatic 
relations and has once been at war with Persia in vindication of British interests in 
or upon the borders of that country ; and although large sums of money have been 
throughout the present century and are still annually expended in the maintenance of 
those interests, both by Her Majesty’s Government and by the Government of India, 
we have not been able to discover in our records any clear definition of the principles 
upon which our policy towards the Persian kingdom is based, of the objects which it 
should keep in view, or of the scope and limits of the respective shares of responsibility, 
political and financial, which should be assumed by the two partners, viz., Her 
Majesty’s Government and the Government of India, who are jointly concerned in the 
defence of Anglo-Indian interests in the dominions of the Shah. 

We desire, therefore, not merely to examine, in response to your Lordship’s 
invitation, the particular steps that may require to be taken for the maintenance or 
extension of British interests in Persia at the present juncture, but to survey a wider 
field, and, while there is yet time, to discuss how those interests should be definitely 
safeguarded in the future that seems to be imminent, and what part in the outlay or 
in the measures that may be necessitated for that end, should be assumed respectively 
by Her Majesty’s Government and by the Government of India. 

It may not be inappropriate to state, in the first place, what wc conceive British, 
i.e., Anglo-Indian, interests in Persia to be. They are commercial, political, 
strategical, and telegraphic. The total annual value of British trade with Persia 
has been estimated (and, from the calculations that we have made, wc believe the 
estimate to be below the mark) as approximately 3,500,000/.; and while a great 
deal of this trade, particularly in the south and east, is with British India, yet the 
northern and western avenues of entry are devoted in the main to commercial con* 
nections with the British Isles. The total volume of Anglo-Persian trade continues, 
in spite of the difficulties encountered and the increasing insecurity in Persia, to rise 
and, under a more efficient and less venal regime, would probably attain to muc 
larger dimensions. Similarly, although the experience of the past decade has not been 


P 1 *' so ’ 

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encouraging to British mercantile investment in Persia, as the experience of tho 
Tobacco ltegie, the Persian Mining Bights Company, and other ventures has shown, 
there is nevertheless a good deal of British capital sunk in various industrial under¬ 
takings in different parts of the country. 

The political interests of Great Britain in Persia, although they date originally 
from a period before India had become a British interest at all, were, in their revival 
a century ago, in the main Indian in inception, and^are still largely Indian in character. 
It would he unfair, however, at the present day to attribute to"them an exclusively 
Indian complexion. Ever since the first visit of the late Shah to Europe, Persia has 
been drawn increasingly into the vortex of European politics. Neither Prance, 
Germany, Austria, Italy, Holland, nor Belgium own possessions contiguous to tho 
Persian dominions. Their commercial stake in the country is relatively small. 
Notwithstanding, they find it to their interest to maintain, what are in some cases 
costly and extensive diplomatic establishments at Tehran, and they occupy a minor, 
but nevertheless a definite, position upon the local diplomatic stage. It is to bo 
surmized, therefore, that, even had British India not existed, or had it passed into other 
hands, the British Government would nevertheless before now have been compelled to 
take an active political interest in Persian fortunes. Persia is, in fact, one of those 
countries which, whether or not they had fallen into the orbit of Western Powers, 
more vigorous than themselves, must inevitably have attracted the attention of Europe, 
partly from their increasing infirmity, but still more from the opportunities suggested 
by their latent, though neglected, sources of strength. The twofold British interest 
and responsibility here indicated have indeed been recognized by the system, now of 
long standing, under which the charges of the diplomatic establishment maintained by 
" Her Majesty’s Government at Tehran arc shared between the Imperial and the Indian 
Exchequers. That such a division of common interest has become necessary, that the 
politics of Tehran, which with one eye turned towards India looks with the other 
towards St. Petersburgh and Constantinople, are but one aspect of the eternal Eastern 
question, and that the control of British diplomacy at Tehran must therefore be vested 
in the hands of Pier Majesty’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, are propositions 
which forty years ago were hotly contested by certain schools of thought, but that will 
not any longer be a matter of dispute. They serve to illustrate tho Imperial, as 
distinct from the purely Indian, character of Anglo-Persian relations. 

The strategical interests of Great Britain in Persia arise from conditions with 
which India is most intimately concerned. Long before the boundaries of British 
India had "been extended to their present limits, or before Bussia had become a great 
Central Asian Power, approaching or impinging at many points upon the Indian 
frontiers, the fortunes of Persia, though not at that time a coterminous country, had 
become a matter of vital concern to the British dominion in India. In the early 
years of the present century, when the ambitions of France were tho main source of 
apprehension, it was through Persia that a blow at British supremacy was expected to 
be struck, and that an invasion of India was planned. The same idea has reappeared 
at intervals since. Now that the boundaries of Afghanistan, which have been 
demarcated and guaranteed by Great Britain, march for many hundreds of miles with 
those of Persia ; that Persian territory is also coterminous for hundreds of miles with 
Baluchistan, a State under a British Protectorate, and in large measure actually 
administered by the officers of the Government of India; and that the sea which 
washes the southern coasts of Persia is one in which, both from its proximity to the 
Indian Ocean and as a result of the exertions of the past century, Indian interests and 
influence have become supreme—it is clear that Persia has assumed a strategical 
importance, in relation to British India, which might not be serious, were the 
resources or the designs of that country itself alone to be considered; but which is 
indisputably great, when it is remembered that closely pressing upon Persia and upon 
Afghanistan is the ever-growing momentum of a Power whose interests in Asia are 
not always in accord with our own, and that the Persian Gulf is beginning to attract 
the interest of other and sometimes rival nations. These conditions, however, while 
they indicate the supreme concern which those who arc responsible for the govern¬ 
ment of India cannot fail to feel in the fortunes of Persia, are nevertheless sufficiently 
obvious in their general application to render it unnecessary for us to point out their 
far more than local range, or to argue that they affect not merely the destinies of 
British dominion in India, but those of the British Empire. It is from this point of 
view that we hold strongly the opinion that Persia in its strategical, no less than in its 
political, aspect js not only an Indian, but is also an Imperial, concern, and that we 

[349] -B 2 


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feel no hesitation in appealing to Her Majesty’s Government for a frank and ’generous, 
recognition of this common responsibility. 

The telegraphic interests of Great Britain in Persia may be said to be evenly 
divided between the mother-country and India. Por whilst on the one hand the wires- 
that have been constructed between the north-west frontier and Tehran, and which 
provide the earlier link in the Persian section of the main overland connection with 
the east, are in the hands of a Company whose domicile is in London, from Tehran 
onwards to the' Gulf, the undertaking is conducted by an establishment that is 
recruited and paid for by the Government of India, while its head-quarters are in 
the India Office in London. This twofold system exists in order to maintain a 
Oonnection which may be said to be equally British and Indian, since it is equally 
indispensable to the interests of both countries; but which also lias an ulterior and 
wider scope, inasmuch as the Trans-Persian wires, and the submarine cables by which 
they are supplemented in the Persian Gulf, are largely utilized for the conveyance 
Of messages between Great Britain and places lying beyond India, notably the 
Australasian Colonies, Prom a calculation based upon the aggregate results of 
the past five years, we have ascertained that no less than 30 per cent, of the total 
traffic is of this description. Nevertheless the cost, in so far as it is borne by 
either Government, devolves exclusively upon the Indian, and not upon the Home 
Exchequer. 

Such are the main interests of Great Britain in Persia. It will be observed that 
the shares that may be claimed by the mother-country and by India in the sum total 
of those interests have in the passage of time become so interwoven and fused as to 
render the task of separating or distinguishing them neither easy nor profitable. It 
may not he difficult to 'distinguish between sources of expenditure which should 
more properly fall to the charge of the one or the other partner. But we maintain 
that enough has been said to prove that on the broad field of international poiicy 
Persia is not exclusively an Indian interest, but is emphatically an Imperial interest 
of Great Britain; and that the latter should he prepared to exert her full strength for 
the defence of that interest, should it he jeopardized or impugned. 

In discussing the manner in which it is desirable th it these principles, if 
accepted, shotild be carried into action, we are anxious at the outset to make our 
position, in one respect, perfectly clear. We have no desire to make au addition to 
the political or territorial responsibilities of India, for which we have not, under 
existing conditions, the means either in. money or in men. We are not about to 
propose that there should be established auv Protectorate, open or covert, over any 
part of the Shah’s dominions, that might compel us in the future* to hold the country 
so protected by force of arms. Eor the present our ambitions are exclusively limited 
to making secure the interest which we have already built up, and still more,to 
preventing it from being undermined or taken from us.by others, with the result not 
only of a considerable accretion of strength to. them, but of positive detriment to 
ourselves. We have, in fine, no-desire to disturb the political status quo in Persia so 
long as it can be maintained. We prefer, indeed, to invest it with such .renewed 
vitality as may he found possible. But we press for an early decision and for early 
action, since, unless we bestir ourselves, there ?is good reason for fearing that, the 
already trembling balance may he disturbed by others to our disadvantage. 

We now proceed to draw a picture of the present state of British interests in 
Persia, as they present themselves to out eyes, and to examine the dangers by which 
they appear to be threatened. 

- The political destinies of a country and a Government, such as those of Persia, 
are likely to be determined in the main by.her geographical position in relation to her 
neighbours, the principal of whom are Russia and Great Britain. There is a curious 
borrespondence, but there are also notable differences between the positions of these 
'two Powers vis-a-vis with Persia. The entire northern frontier of Persia is now 
contiguous with Russian tenitory,. with the exceptio a of that portion which borders 
upon the'Caspian Sea—a distinction, but not a difference, inasmuch as that sea has to 
all intents and purposes been converted into a Russian lake. Russian territory .also 
overlaps the north-east corner of the Persian dominions. Great Britain enjoys a 
somewhat similar preponderance of influence on the south, by virtue of her hitherto 
unchallenged supremacy, both naval and commercial, in the Persian Gulf.; while, 
owing to recent developments on the side of Baluchistan, her land territories also 
touch those of Persia upon the south-east. But there are these broad differences 
between the two positions; firstly* that whereas the Russian territories that are 
limitrophe with Persia on the north arc continuous cither with those of European 


5 


£>r with those of • Asiatic Russia, the immense resources of - both' of which 'dominions 
can he brought by a skilfully designed system of railways, and deposited with little 
trouble and with no delay, upon the Persian frontier itself—the forces of G reat Britain, 
if required for purposes-either of menace or attack, would require to be conveyed by 
sea, and would be separated by a great distance from their base ; the land connection 
on the Perso-Baluch side, being as yet too precarious and remote to admit of its 
.being taken into serious consideration in the present context; secondly, that whereas 
the Russian land approaches upon, the: north are in her own exclusive possession, the 
maritime aocess of Great Britain on the soutli is equally open to.any other Power 
.posses mg a naval marine. Hence the marked and inevitable distinction between the 
power of persuasion or menace possessed by Russia in the north, as compared with 
that at the disposal of Great Britain in the south, the advantage enjoyed by the 
^former being enhanced by the fact that the Persian capital and. Court are situated 
in the northern or Russian, and not-in the southern or British zone of influence. 

In these circumstances, it’ is not surprising to read of the increasing and indis¬ 
putable supremacy which Russia has established in Northern Persia. While we think 
that no efforts should be spared to safeguard so much as is left to us of the 
trade that enters the country by the Trebizond-Tabreez route, of the trade of 
,Tehran, and of that of North-East Persia (concerning which it may be noted that the 
imports into Meshed from British India, which in 1893-94 represented a value of 
.198,500/. and in 1891-95 of 312,000/., have in 1897-98 sunk to 130,000/.), and while 
as long as the capital remains at Tehran, which is also the centre of important British 
interests in the shape of the telegraph administration and the Imperial Bank of Persia, 
.it is essential that British influence there should he asserted on a scale as nearly as 
possible equivalent to.that of Russia—we are yet of opinion that the advantages enjoyed 
.by Russia in the field under discussion are so overwhelming as to render any attempt 
to dispute or to shake her position there fruitless; and that our own energies can with 
greater wisdom and with superior chances of success he directed towards the 
protection and consolidation of the British sphere of influence in the centre and 
.south. It is to a more critical examination of this subject that we now 7 turn. 

Sir M. Durand has drawn, a line across Persia from Khanikin on the Turkish 
. :* mtier on the west, through Kermaushah, Harnadan, Ispahan, Yezd, and Kerman to 
,Seistart, and the Afghan frontier on the east, as indicating approximately the existiug 
line of partition between the British and Russian spheres of influence both political 
.and commercial in Persia. 

Eollow'ing the same order from the west, w r e concur with w 7 hat he has written 
about the importance of fostering the Bagdad trade route vi& Kermanshah to Tehran, 
British commerce by which approaches in value to 1,000,000/. per annum. This is a 
route of peculiar value both to British and to Indian trade, and one upon which we 
should on no account forfeit the supremacy. We have no hesitation in recom¬ 
mending the substitution of a British Vice-Consul at Kermanshah for the present 
'Native Agent; although we think that the cost of the proposed appointment which 
lies outside of what jnay be called the more strictly Indian zone, and which will be 
subordinate to the Consulate-General at Tehran, should be borne by Imperial and not 
by Indian revenues. 

Whatever be the prospects of opening up, either by road or by railway (and 
"concerning the latter we are sceptical), the country that lies northward of the Karun 
River, and that is inhabited by the Lurs and other noma l tribes, it is certain that 
British influence has obtained a material foothold in that corner of the Shah’s 
dominions, through which the Karun flows in its middle and lower course, and where 
the road now being constructed.through the Bakhtiari country, by contract between 
'the Bakbtiari Chiefs and Messrs. Lynch, should open an alternative and almost 
exclusively British door of commercial access to Ispahan. 

Continuing in an easterly direction, w r e have noticed from the recent Consular 
Report of Mr. J. R. Preece, Her Majesty’s Consul at Ispahan, that ‘‘British trade in 
Ispahan has shown during the last two years, if not an absolute decrease, at all events, 
no expansion w-hatever,” while great strides have been made iu Russian importations, 
notably of glassware and hardware. We agree that the British Consul should be 
raised, in respect of title and pay, to the same level as the recently arrived Russian 
representative, although, as this is a matter which mainly concerns the English 
,Foreign Office, we are not clear that we are called upon to advise upon the subject. 
We cannot, however, too strongly emphasize our opinion that in any partition either 
of commercial or political spheres of influence in Persia, Ispahan, the old (and, if 
Persia should ultimately break up, possibly a future) capital, the seat of the Sefavi 


0 


dynasty, the principal market of Central Persia, and (far more than Tehran) the focus 
of Persian nationality, must, on every ground, be included in the zone in which 
British interests are supreme. 

We also think that British interests are most inadequately represented at Shiraz 
by the present Native Agent, who is a nonentity, without influence or power; and that 
the experiment of bringing the Resident of the Persian Gulf, who is also Consul- 
General for Pars, to reside during the summer at the capital of the province, which is 
within his official area of jurisdiction, should he given a further trial. Colonel 
Wilson in 1895, and Colonel Meade in 1898, spent the summer months at Shiraz, but 
were compelled to hire house accommodation at their own expense. If these visits 
are made recurrent, we are inclined to think that, as no suitable house appears to be 
open either to purchase or to rent, a site should be purchased and a house erected 
thereon. To this suggestion also we will revert. Shiraz is a place of considerable 
importance ; and were it not for the great influence that has for long been exercised 
there by the officials of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, British interests 
must have suffered from the neglect to which they have hitherto been exposed. 

The districts lying to the east of Ispahan and Shiraz contain the important 
cities and trade centres of Yezd and Kerman, connected by one of the principal postal 
and caravan tracks of Persia. Both of these towns and districts lie south of the 
natural line of division between Northern and Southern Persia; and in both British 
commercial and political influence has, in recent years, been actively vindicated. In 
September 1893 Mr. Pergusson, the Manager of the local branch of the Imperial 
Bank, was appointed unpaid Vice-Consul at Yezd. It is now suggested that a Vice- 
Consul, if appointed to Bunder Abbas, might pass his summer at Yezd, where it is no 
doubt intrinsically desirable that British commercial interests should be represented 
by some one not engaged in business or trade. We will for the moment reserve our 
comments upon this suggeslion. At Kerman, which is the capital of an important 
province, and the seat of a Governor-General, the appointment of a British Consul, 
which was first sanctioned under exceptional circumstances in the case of Captain 
Sykes in 1891, has at frequent intervals since, the latest being our despatch of tho 
10th August, lt98, been the subject of discussion between Her Majesty’s Government 
and the Government of India. The present position is this, that for live years the 
Government cf India have expressed their willingness to contribute one-half of the 
cost of the Kerman Consulate up to a limit of 6,000 rupees per annum. The views 
of the Foreign Office upon this proposal, which was communicated to it by your 
Lordship on the 21st September, 189S, have not yet been received by us. It "is now 
proposed that this Consulate should be made permanent, aud that possibly a Native 
Agent under its orders should be sent to Bampur. Before discussing these proposals, 
we think it advisable to analyze the larger issues raised by the questions of Scistanand 
the Persian Gulf. 

Concerning Seistan, its importance and the present position there, the tacts are, 
we think, sufficient to show that Seistan is, by reason of its geographical position in 
relation both to North Khorassan, to Western Afghanistan, to British Baluchistan, 
and to the Persian Gulf, a position of no small strategical importance. Seistan is 
the present meeting-point of the advanced pioneers of British and Russian influence. 
Perhaps on the whole, owing to recent activity on our part, the British position and 
chances are the more hopeful. It is essential in the future that Seistan should be 
retained in the British zone. It is fortunately not too late to secure that consum* 
mation. The steps which should be taken with that object will be examined when wo 
formulate our final recommendations at the close of this despatch. 

South of Seistan lies the still imperfectly known district of Persian Baluchistan. 
Every year this province is being brought into closer contact with British associations', 
partly from tho visitsof British officials, partly from the wide-spreading influence exercised 
by the Nushki-Seistan trade route, still more from the close connections, political and 
racial, prevailing between the inhabitants of the two sides of the Perso-Baluch border 
—a condition of affairs which is likely to be confirmed by the inevitable increase of 
British influence in the dominions of the Khan of Kalat. 

Our inspection of the various sub-areas composing what we have described as the 
British sphere has now brought us to the Persian Gulf—a subject upon which it is 
necessary that we should address your Lordship. 

The de jure position in the Persian Gulf is that of a sea open to the flag of all 
nations, the northern shores and territorial waters of which are included in the 
dominions of Persia, while its western and southern coasts are partially owned and 
partially claimed by Turkey, or are in the occupation of Arab tribes, who have 


7 


entered into Treaty relationships of varying character, constituting a sort of veiiecl 
Protectorate, with Great Britain. The islands in the Gulf are owned either by Persia 
or by Arab Chiefs (in the case of Bahrein under British protection) ; but upon one of 
the Persian Islands, viz., Kislnn, Great Britain possesses a piece of laud by virtue of 
an original grant from the Imam of Muscat, to whom the island once belouged. 
Outside the entrance to the Persian Gulf, but included in the same political system, 
are, on the northern shore of the Arabian Sea, the coasts of Persian Baluchistan, 
along which the overland wires of the Indo-European Telegraph Company run as far 
as Jask, where a reserve of territory exists under an Agreement concluded in 1SS7 
between the British and Persian Governments, and where a detachment of Indian 
troops, who had previously been stationed there between the years 1879 and 1887, was 
replaced in January 1898 in consequence of the murder of a British telegraph official 
and the disturbed state of Persian Baluchistan. A larger detachment was at the same 
time dispatched to Charbar, near the eastern limits of the same province. On the 
southern and western coast is the still independent Kingdom or Sultanate of Oman 
(Muscat). 

The de facto position upon the waters and on the shores of the Persian Gulf 
reflects a more positive British predominance than the preceding paragraph might 
indicate. In the early years of the present century the Slave Trade was rampant in 
the Gulf, and the vessels of the Indian Marine were engaged in a long and arduous 
struggle with the Arab pirates who infested its southern coasts. This conflict, which 
was conducted entirely by British agency and means, without any help from the 
Persian Government, resulted in the establishment of Treaty relations with the great 
majority of the Arab Chiefs, under which they bound themselves to observe perpetual 
peace, and to refer all disputes to the British Resident at Bushire. The par Britannica , 
which has ever since, with rare exceptions, been maintained, is the issue of these 
arrangements, and is the exclusive work of this country. Of similar origin were the 
soundings of the channels and the surveys of the shores of the Persian Gulf, which the 
navigators of all nations owe to the labours of a long line of naval officers of the 
Indian service. Meanwhile, British trade has acquired almost a monopoly of the 
foreign commerce of the Gulf ports. Indian “ bunias” from Shikarpur and other parts 
of Sind hove settled in considerable numbers at Lingah, Bunder Abbas, Bushire, and 
Bahrein. They frequently farm the customs. The foreign imports and exports pass 
through their hands. These are for the most part conveyed to and from the Gulf in 
British ships, more than one Anglo-Indian Company (the “British India,” the 
“ Bombay and Persia,” and the “ Anglo-Arabian and Persian Gulf”; having main¬ 
tained for years a merchant-steamer service between Kurrachec and Bussorah, touching 
at the Gulf ports on the way, whilst the rival ventures that have occasionally been 
attempted by foreign nations have uniformly failed and have been withdrawn. 

As the result of careful calculations of the trade Returns of the three years 
1895-96-97, which are the latest at our disposal, we have ascertained that the total 
value of imports and exports in the Persian Gulf (including the Persian ports of 
Bunder Abbas, Lingah, Bushire, and Moliammerah, the Arab ports on the opposite 
coast, and Bahrein) in that triennial period amounted to 17,211,300/. (at the rate of 
15 rupees — 1/ ). Of this total, local trade accounted for 5,124,000/., and external 
trade for 12,117,300/. ; while of the latter total the trade with British possessions 
(including India) amounted to 9,709,500/., or over 80 per cent, of the entire external 
trade. In the same three years, out of a total of 2,16 L steamers which entered and 
cleared from the Gulf ports, 2,039 were British, and their tonnage represented 84 per 
cent, of the total tonnage. If the Returns of Persian ports alone be required, the 
figures are—total trade, 11,172,000/., of which local trade ~ 2,169,400/. and external 
trade = 9,002,600/., the British proportion of the latter being 7,494,200/., or 83 
per cent. To these totals in cither case there should, in our opinion, certainly 
be added those of Bussorah, which amounted in the same triennial period to 
2,157,300/. Unfortunately, the manner in which these have been prepared does not 
admit of our distinguishing the countries of origin or destination. The proportion, 
however, that should properly he assigned to Anglo-Indian commerce may be inferred 
from the British percentage of shipping that entered or cleared from that port in the 
three years referred to. It amounted to no less than 93 per cent, both of the number 
and tonnage of the steamers engaged. 

During the last thirty years the maintenance of the submarine cables of the Indo- 
European Telegraph Company from Eao to Jask, and of the land lines from that 
place to Kurrachee, has also devolved upon the Indian Government, and has tended to 
increase an already preponderant influence over both the waters and the shores of this 


8 


sea. Latterly there has been a deliberate but necessary consolidation of our influence 
in certain quarters where trouble threatened or where rivalry was feared. Outside 
the entrance to the Persian Gulf, but included within the sphere of its political 
influence, the Arab State of Muscat lias for years been predominantly controlled 
by British influence; its trade is similarly in Anglo-Indian hands; and its Ruler 
has not merely for years been subsidized by the Government of India, but in 
1891 entered into an Agreement with us, Under the orders of Her Majesty’s Govern¬ 
ment, not to alienate any portion of his dominions to any other Power. 

Such, briefly summarized, is the position that has been won by Great Britain, not 
without the expenditure of many millions of money and the sacrifice of many valuable 
lives, in the Persian Gulf. In its vindication we have more than once been called 
upon to enter into military occupation of ports or islands in the Gulf. The Island 
of Kharak was occupied by Indian forces from 1888 to 1842, and again in 1856-57. 
Bushire was held during the latter years, as also Were Mohammerali and Aliwaz, upon 
the Karun. The occupation of these places was an illustration of the vigour with 
which, in past years, our ascendency lias been maintained. Their abandonment was a' 
proof of the reluctance which has invariably been displayed to emphasize or to 
perpetuate these responsibilities. 

The advance of Russia across the deserts that form a natural barrier of division 
between Northern and Southern Persia could not be regarded with anything but 
uneasiness by the Government of India, and the appearance of her flag in the Persian 
Gulf would import a novel element of unfest into a situation that is at mo time without 
its anxious features. We desire deliberately to say to your Lordship, with a full con¬ 
sciousness of. our responsibility in so saying, that, difficult as we find it ih existing* 
circumstances to meet the financial and military strain imposed upon us by the ever- 
increasing proximity of Russian power upon the northern and north-western frontiers 
of India from the Pamirs to Herat, we could not contemplate without dismay the 
prospect of Russian neighbourhood in Eastern or Southern Persia, the inevitable 
consequence of which must be a great increase of our own burdens; while the 
maritime defensibility of India would require to be altogether reconsidered were the 
dangers of a land invasion to be supplemented by the appearance of a possible 
antagonist as a naval Power in waters contiguous to Indian shores. 

IJpon the question of allowing any European Power, and more especially - Russia, 
to overrun Central and Southern Persia, and so to reach the Gulf, or to acquire naval 
facilities in the latter even without such territorial connections, we do not conceive 
that any doubt whatever can be entertained ; and we imagine that it w ill be accepted 
as a cardinal axiom of British policy that no such development would be acquiesced in 
by Her Majesty’s Government. We w r ould arrive with the greater confidence at this 
conclusion, since we were lately informed by your Lordship thai during the present 
year Lord Salisbury communicated to the Persian Government that “ Her Majesty’s 
Government felt it to be their duty to renew r the intimation that it- would not be 
compatible with the interests of the British Empire that any European Power should 
exercise control or jurisdiction over the ports of the Persian Gulf.” 

Such being the existing situation in Southern Persia, and the principles of policy 
accepted by Her Majesty’s Government being as already stated, we pass to a 
consideration of the manner in which these principles should be translated into action, 
and of the steps which should, in our opinion, be taken at the present juncture for the 
protection of the common interests of Great Britain and the Indian Empire. 

We are aware that, more than half-a-century ago, there were exchanged, and 
have more than once since been repeated, certain explicit assurances concerning the 
integrity and independence of Persia between the Governments of Great Britain and 
Russia. The first of these assurances were entered into by Lord Palmerston and 
Count Nesselrode. The former, in a despatch dated the 5th September, 1884, placed 
on record that “ the Governments of Great Britain and Russia are acting with regard 
to the affairs of Persia in the same spirit, and are equally animated by a sincere 
desire to maintain not only the internal tranquillity, but also the independence and 
integrity of Persia.” Count Nesselrode, in despatches dated the 20th October, 1888, 
and the 29tli January, 1839, reiterated these pledges on behalf of his Government! 
Again in 1878 the continued existence of these mutual assurances was referred to 
with satisfaction by Count de Brunnow, as reported in a despatch by Lord Granville; 
dated the 10th July, 1873. Einally, on the 12tli March, 1888, M. de Giers intimated! 
through M. de Staal, to Lord Salisbury that the Russian Government- “have no 
objection to placing again on record that their view's on this point are in no way 
altered;'’ and a communication to the effect that the engagements between Great 


9 


Britain and Russia to respect and promote the integrity and independence of the 
Persian Kingdom had again been renewed and confirmed, was accordingly made by 
Sir H. D. Wolff to the Shah. 

Whilst it may he presumed that these pledges, so frequently renewed, are still in 
existence, we are yet of opinion that they are in themselves quite insufficient to arrest 
the centripetal progress of Russian influence in Persia, or to save either the Persian 
Kingdom or British interests in it from the erosive agencies that we have described. 
Within the limits of a nominally still existing integrity and independence so many 
encroachments upon both those attributes are possible that, by almost imperceptible 
degrees, they pass into the realm of constitutional fiction, where they may continue 
to provide an exercise for the speculations of the jurist long after they have been 
contemptuously ignored by statesmen. 

If this proposition be accepted, it behoves us to examine the various alternative 
policies that have been or can be proposed. The first of these is the policy of a 
regeneration of Persia by Anglo-Russian means, i.e ., joint action by Great Britain and 
Bussia to insist upon reforms, to reorganize the administration and finances, to 
develop the resources of the country, to lend the requisite means—in fact, to convert 
the Persian Government; by combined philanthropy, from a moribund into a solvent 
institution. This policy has already been discussed and rejected, for reasons which 
need not be repeated here. 

The alternative policy is that w r e should plainly intimate that any Russian 
encroachments in Northern Persia will provoke corresponding measures for the 
protection of British interests in the south. 

Nevertheless, before we recommend that such a policy should be essayed, we 
desire to raise the question whether, though it be impossible to conclude an Agreement 
with Russia for the joint patronage and development of Persia, it might not yet be 
possible to come to an understanding with her for the separate patronage and develop¬ 
ment of that country in distinct and clearly defined compartments by the two great 
Powers—in other words, for a recognition of British and Russian spheres of interest in 
the dominions of the Shah. Recent events in China have familiarized the public 
mind with the idea of such spheres of interest, although their existence would appear 
to be still somewhat lacking both in clearness of definition and in precision of outline. 
The Viceroy has observed in recent telegrams with reference to a Persian loan and to 
Mining Concessions in that country, indications of a willingness to concede to Russia 
liberties in the north of Persia, parallel in scope and substance with those conceded to 
Great Britain in the south ; and it is worthy of consideration whether in an expansion 
of this suggestion might not be found a feasible scheme. 

We have already alluded to the line across Persia drawn by Sir M. Durand from 
Khanikin on the Turkish frontier, through Kermanshah, Hamadan, Ispahan, Yezd, 
and Kerman to Seistan, as indicating the northern limits of the sphere within which 
British political influence and trade are paramount. To some extent this partition is 
assisted by geographical conditions, the great deserts of Central Persia constituting a 
natural barrier between the north and the south, and roughly dividing the one from 
the other. But this situation is modified both in the west of Persia, where there are 
no deserts, and where there is no physical line of demarcation between the respective 
spheres of influence; in the centre of Persia, where Ispahan can hardly be said to 
constitute the natural frontier of any geographical zone; and also in the extreme east, 
where Seistan, the inclusion of which in the British sphere would be an obligatory 
point, lies not to the south but to the north of the great desert. These considerations 
might not affect the success of any engagement that was carried out with equal bona 
Jides by both parties ; but they might become a fruitful source of friction were such a 
good understanding not to be counted upon in the future. In any case, we would 
recommend that the line of partition suggested by Sir M. Durand should be so far 
amended as to substitute Kaslian for Ispahan. It would be undesirable that any 
Russian railway should penetrate farther south than Kaslian, which indeed is 
separated by a considerable range of hills from Ispahan, or that Russia should have 
right of access to the very fringe of the latter district. 

We have observed that in China the Agreement recently concluded between 
Her Majesty’s Government and Russia as to spheres of interest has related to railways 
only. Either party has pledged itself not to seek on its own account or on behalf of 
others for Railway Concessions in the rival sphere, and not to obstruct, directly or 
indirectly, applications for such Concessions, supported by the other in that sphere. 
Primd facie there does not appear to be any reason why such an Agreement should not 
eouallv be extended to mines, roads, and other industrial or economic undertakings. 

1 [349] C 


10 


The value of such an understanding is considerable; because although political 
influence is not expressly mentioned, yet in Eastern countries commercial and industrial 
enterprises are the familiar agencies through which political influence is exercised by 
alien Powers, and because that influence is apt to follow in the wake of railways and 
trade. We do not think, if such an Agreement were arrived at with Russia, with 
reference to the Persian territories lying north and south of the predicated line, that 
there would be an end to Russian designs in Southern Persia or in the Persian Gulf. 
Such a result might, perhaps, ensue from an engagement that no political influence 
should be exercised by either party on the opposite side of the line. But there would 
be manifest difficulties in arriving at any such understanding; since it would be out 
of the question to remove the British Representatives, either at Tehran, at Tabreez, 
or at Meshed, whose functions necessarily involve the exercise of some sort of 
political influence, while a corresponding objection would no doubt be felt by the 
Russian Government. But even an engagement limited to railway and commercial 
exploitation would have this effect, that it would deprive Russia of the means by 
which political or territorial ambitions in the rival sphere could most easily be carried 
out, and would render it difficult for her to push them to success, as long as Great 
Britain remained on the alert. 

There are, however, difficulties and drawbacks in the case of such an under¬ 
standing which it would be impolitic to ignore. The facts with reference to Seistan 
indicate the absolute necessity of including that district within the British sphere. 
Nevertheless, Seistan is physically and administratively a part of the Province of 
Khorassan, from which it is severed by no clear line of division, the Governorship of 
Seistan being vested in a member of the old ruling family of Kain, the two existing 
heads of which are brothers, residing respectively at Tabbas and Birjand. Nor. again, is 
it clear that Russia would be willing to cancel the engagement with regard to railway 
construction which she has recently renewed with the Persian Government, and to 
hand over the southern half of Persia to possible railway exploitation by British 
agency, in return, for a monopoly of similar exploitation (which may be said to be 
already at her disposal) in the northern half. These, however, are considerations 
which could only be decided by the attitude of Russia herself, were she approached on 
the subject by Her Majesty’s Government. We indicate them merely for the purpose 
of showing that we are far from confident that the suggestion, if put forward, will meet 
with a favourable reception. 

A more serious drawback, from the point of view of British interests, is the fact 
that the capital of Persia would lie in the northern or Russian sphere, and that Russian 
influence there, already predominant, could hardly fail to become supreme. The 
situation that has recently arisen in China would present itself with tenfold gravity 
and emphasis. A desire would not merely be intimated to connect the capital with 
the Russian railway system ; but a line itself would, we may imagine, at once be made 
to Tehran, while corresponding lines would in all probability be constructed from the 
Russian frontier in Georgia to Tabreez, and in Transeaspia to Meshed. With the 
three great cities of Northern Persia thus permanently linked with the Russian system, 
the power of pressure exercised by the Russian Government, which is aheadv 
considerable, would be positively overwhelming. The results would, in all probability, 
be felt beyond the limits of Persia. They would aggravate the already formidable 
offensive strength of Russia against Northern Afghanistan, and w r ould increase the 
weight and influence of her position throughout Central Asia. In Persia itself, the Shah 
w'ould tend more and more to become a Russian puppet, and Northern Persia a 
Russian Pro-Consulate. We should look with great anxiety, in such a case, upon the 
fate of such institutions as the Imperial Bank of Persia and the Indo-European 
Telegraph Department, whose head-quarters are in Tehran. We should fear a marked 
diminution of influence on the part of Her Majesty’s Representative at the capital; 
and w r e do not conceal our anticipations that in the long run such a partition mi "lit 
involve the permanent break up of the Persian Kingdom, and, if it did not ultimately 
lead to rival Russian and British Protectorates in the north and south, might at any 
rate result in the selection of another capital, and in the rule of more than one native 
Prince in Persia. 

Neither will it be overlooked by Her Majesty’s Government that, while any such 
arrangement wflth Russia might preclude that Power from obtaining control over 
Central and Southern Persia and in that w^ay reaching the Persian Gulf, it w^ould not 
for one moment retard, but might on the contrary accelerate, her advance to the same 
objective through Mesopotamia by w^ay of Bagdad. This is an issue wdiich w r e should 
regard with scarcely inferior repugnance : but the problem is one w hich we do not 


11 


f eel called upon to discuss upon the present occasion, and which would require to be 
examined on independent grounds. We should strongly deprecate the political rivalry 
of any European nation in the neighbourhood of the Persian Gulf, even though such 
a situation, w r hile fraught with constant annoyance, might not, as in the case of Russia, 
constitute a positive menace to the Indian Empire. 

We have now placed before your Lordship the pros and cons, as they present 
themselves to our eyes, of the alternative policies in Persia. While not sanguine as to 
the prospects of success, we are ourselves of opinion that the experiment of an under¬ 
standing with Russia as to future spheres of interest in that country is worthy of being 
made, in the interests both of Persia itself, and still more of harmony between the 
two great Powers, upon whose relations the peace of Asia may be said to depend. 
Should Her Majesty’s Government decide upon making any overtures to the Russian 
Government in the direction indicated, and should they either be rejected or result in 
failure, it will still be possible to adopt the alternative policy. Indeed, if the terms 
of a reasonable arrangement are proffered by one party, and are refused by the other, 
the natural corollary would appear to be that the originator of the proposal should 
reserve to himself the right to protect by whatever means may be at his disposal the 
interests w r hich he has endeavoured to conserve by friendly co-operation; and should 
meet what would in such a case be conscious aggression on the one side by retaliation 
on the other. 

In any case, however, though still more in the case of a failure to arrive at 
an understanding with Russia, we conceive that it is incumbent upon Her Majesty’s 
Government and upon the Government of India to come to an early decision upon 
the subsidiary question, namely, as to the steps that require forthwith to be taken in 
order to safeguard British and Indian interests in the so-called British sphere in Persia 
from the competition with which w r e have shown them to be threatened. 

* * # * # 

We have &c. 

(Signed) CURZON OE KEDLESTON. 

E. H. II. COLLEN. 

C. M. R1YAZ. 

C. E. DAWKINS. 

T. RALEIGH. 

R. GARDINER. 



LONDON: 

P1UNTKD BY HAKIllSON AND SONS. 



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